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Abstract. We provide an in-depth study of the knowledge-theoretic
aspects of communication in so-called gossip protocols. Pairs of agents
communicate by means of calls in order to spread information—so-called
secrets—within the group. Depending on the nature of such calls knowl-
edge spreads in different ways within the group. Systematizing existing
literature, we identify 18 different types of communication, and model
their epistemic effects through corresponding indistinguishability rela-
tions. We then provide a classification of these relations and show its
usefulness for an epistemic analysis in presence of different communica-
tion types. Finally, we explain how to formalise the assumption that the
agents have common knowledge of a distributed epistemic gossip proto-
col.
1 Introduction
In the gossip problem [31,6] a number of agents, each one knowing a piece of
information (a secret) unknown to the others, communicate by one-to-one in-
teractions (e.g., telephone calls). The result of each call is that the two agents
involved in it learn all secrets the other agent knows at the time of the call.
The problem consists in finding a sequence of calls which disseminates all the
secrets among the agents in the group. It sparked a large literature in the 70s
and 80s [31,6,16,8,29], typically on establishing—in the above and other variants
of the problem—the minimum number of calls to achieve dissemination of all
the secrets. This number has been proven to be 2n− 4, where n, the number of
agents, is at least 4.
The gossip problem constitutes an excellent toy problem to study informa-
tion dissemination in distributed environments. A vast literature on distributed
protocols has taken up the problem and analyzed it together with a wealth
of variations including different communication primitives (e.g., broadcasting
instead of one-to-one calls), as well as communication structures (networks),
faulty communication channels [9], and probabilistic information transmission,
where the spreading of gossips is used to model the spread of an epidemic [5,28].
Surveys are [13,22,19,23].
Background The present paper investigates a knowledge-based approach to the
gossip problem in a multi-agent system. Agents perform calls following individ-
ual epistemic protocols they run in a distributed fashion. These protocols tell
the agents which calls to execute depending on what they know, or do not know,
about the information state of the agents in the group. We call the resulting dis-
tributed programs epistemic gossip protocols, or gossip protocols, for short. Such
protocols were introduced and studied in [4,1]. ‘Distributed’ means that each
agent acts autonomously, and ‘epistemic’ means that the gossip protocols refer
to the agents’ knowledge. The reliance of these protocols on epistemic properties
makes them examples of so-called knowledge-based protocols, as studied in the
context of distributed systems [27,25,18,11].
Besides the aforementioned [4,1], a number of papers have recently focused
on epistemic gossip protocols. In [21] gossip protocols were studied that aim at
achieving higher-order shared knowledge, for example knowledge of level 2 which
stipulates that everybody knows that everybody knows all secrets. In particular,
a protocol is presented and proved correct that achieves in (k + 1)(n− 2) steps
shared knowledge of level k. Further, in [10] gossip protocols were studied as an
instance of multi-agent epistemic planning that is subsequently translated into
the classical planning language PDDL. More recently, [32] presented a study of
dynamic gossip protocols in which the calls allow the agents not only to share
the secrets but also to share the communication channels (that is, who can
call whom). In turn, [2] studied the computational complexity of distributed
epistemic gossip protocols, while [3] showed that implementability, partial cor-
rectness, termination, and fair termination of these protocols is decidable.
More broadly, the paper positions itself within the long-standing tradition
of analysis of the distributed systems from the perspective of epistemic logic
[12,26]. Such a perspective has led in [27,25,11] to a useful level of abstraction
allowing one to study a number of topics in distributed computing from the
knowledge theoretic perspective, in particular protocols for the sequence trans-
mission problem (for instance the alternating bit protocol) in [18], coordination
[17], and secure communication [7], to mention some. The characteristic feature
of these programs is that they use tests for knowledge.
Contributions The form of communication underpinning the epistemic gossip
problem may vary from work to work, and the above papers sometimes make
different assumptions on the nature of communication upon which the consid-
ered protocols are based. Little attention has been devoted to a systematic anal-
ysis, with the notable exception of [15], which singled out some of the key in-
formational assumptions on calls—specifically observability, synchronicity and
asynchronicity assumptions—and systematically studied the effects of such as-
sumptions on the aforementioned 2n− 4 call-length bound.
It is our claim that research on epistemic gossip protocols can at this point
benefit from a systematisation of the key possible assumptions that a modeler
can make on the type of communication (call) underpinning such protocols.
From an epistemic logic point of view, each call type induces a specific notion of
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knowledge. The comparison of the resulting definitions of knowledge is of obvious
importance for the study of epistemic aspects of communication.
By ‘type of communication’ we mean the way in which communication takes
place and may be observed, and to focus on it we disregard the type of infor-
mation exchanged (in particular, whether higher order knowledge, or commu-
nication links may be exchanged—matters we do not address), or the type of
information the agents have initially at their disposal (e.g., whether it is common
knowledge what the number of agents is).
More specifically, here are the features we focus on. First of all, a call between
two agents takes place in the presence of other agents. What these other agents
become aware of after the call is one natural parameter. We call it privacy. The
second parameter, that we call direction, clarifies in which direction the informa-
tion flows. Here we focus on three possibilities: they exchange all information,
one agent passes all information to the other one, or one agent acquires all infor-
mation available to the other one. The final parameter of a call is what we call
observance. It determines whether the agent(s) affected by the call learn what
information was held by the other agent prior to the call.
By a call type we mean a combination of these three parameters. What
the agents know after a call, or more generally a sequence of calls, depends on
the assumed call type. This yields in total 18 possibilities. The paper provides
a unified framework in which we model, systematically analyse, and compare
these possibilities.
Paper outline Section 2 introduces gossip protocols by example, and identifies
the features of calls we will focus on. Section 3 introduces the syntax and se-
mantics of a simple epistemic language to study communication and its effects
in gossip protocols, together with some motivating examples. Crucially the se-
mantics introduced is parametrised by the indistinguishability relations which,
for each call type, identify the call sequences that the agents cannot distinguish.
These equivalence relations are systematically introduced and defined in Section
4, and then compared in terms of their relative informativeness in Section 5.
The proposed systematisation is then applied in Section 6: first, to deliver gen-
eral results on the analysis of how knowledge changes and evolves through the
execution of gossip protocols (Section 6.1); second, to offer a natural approach
to the problem of modelling common knowledge of protocols in the epistemic
gossip setting (Section 6.2). Finally, Section 7 summarises our results and charts
several directions for future research.
2 Knowledge-Based Gossip
We start by recalling the notion of gossip protocol, moving then to introduce
the formal set-up of the paper.
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2.1 Gossip protocols
Gossip protocols aim at sharing knowledge between agents in a pre-described
way. This is the paradigmatic setup:
Six friends each know a secret. They can call each other by phone. In
each call they exchange all the secrets they know. How many calls are
needed for everyone to know all secrets?
Let us generalise this to the case of n ≥ 2 agents and focus on protocols that
are correct (in the sense that they spread all secrets). If n = 2, the two agents a
and b need to make only one phone call, which we denote by ab (‘a calls b’). For
n = 3, the call sequence ab, bc, ca will do. Let us look at a protocol for n ≥ 4
agents.
Protocol 1 Choose four from the set of agents Ag, say a, b, c, d, and one of
those four, say a. First, a makes n − 4 calls to each agent in Ag \ {a, b, c, d}.
Then, the calls ab, cd, ac, bd are made. Finally a makes another call to each agent
from Ag \ {a, b, c, d}.
This adds up to (n − 4) + 4 + (n − 4) = 2n − 4 calls. For n = 6 we get a call
sequence ae, af , ab, cd, ac, bd, ae, af of 8 calls. All agents are then familiar with
all secrets. It was shown that less than 2n − 4 calls is insufficient to distribute
all secrets [31].
The above protocol assumes that the agents can coordinate their actions
before making the calls. But often such coordination is not possible. Suppose
some students of a given cohort receive an unexpected invitation for a party.
The members of the cohort may be curious to find out about who received an
invitation, in which case they will resort to phone calls based on the knowledge,
or better, ignorance, they have about the secrets (in this context: extended
invitations) of others. Since in such a distributed protocol several agents may
decide to initiate a call at the same time, we assume the presence of an arbiter
who breaks the ties in such cases. Let us now consider such an epistemic protocol.
Protocol 2 (Hear my secret) Any agent a calls agent b if a does not know
that b is familiar with a’s secret.
This protocol has been proven in [1] to terminate and be correct, under specific
assumptions on the type of communication taking place during each call. In this
paper we aim at providing a systematic presentation of such assumptions and
at an analysis of their logical interdependencies.
Throughout the paper we assume a fixed finite set Ag of at least three
agents. We further assume that each agent holds exactly one secret and that
the secrets are pairwise different. We denote by S the set of all secrets, the secret
of agent a by A, the secret of agent b by B, and so on. A secret can be any piece
of data, for instance birthday, salary or social security number. Furthermore, we
assume that each secret carries information identifying the agent to whom this
secret belongs. So once agent b learns secret A she knows that this is the secret
of agent a.
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2.2 Calls
Calls constitute the sole form of knowledge acquisition the agents have at their
disposal. Each call concerns two agents, the caller (a, below) and the callee
(b, below). We call a the partner of b in the call, and vice versa. Any agent c
different from a and b is called an outsider. We study the following properties of
calls:
– privacy , which is concerned with what the outsiders note about the call,
– direction , which clarifies the direction of the information flow in the call,
– observance, which clarifies, when an agent a is informed by b, whether a
sees b’s secrets before adding them to her own set, or only sees the result of
the fusion of the two sets of secrets.
More specifically, we distinguish three privacy degrees of a call where agent
a calls b:
– : every agent c 6= a, b notes that a calls b,
– : every agent c 6= a, b notes that some call takes place, though not between
whom,
– : no agent c 6= a, b notes that a call is taking place.
Intuitively, these degrees can be ordered as <p <p , with meaning
no privacy at all, ensuring anonymity of the caller and callee, and denoting
full privacy. Conversely, from the perspective of the agents not involved in the
call, a call with the privacy level is the most informative, while a call with the
privacy level is the most opaque.
We distinguish three direction types, in short directions, of a call:
– push , written as ⊲. As a result of the call the callee learns all the secrets
held by the caller.
– pull , written as ⊳. As a result of the call the caller learns all the secrets held
by the callee.
– push-pull , written as ♦. As a result of the call the caller and the callee learn
each other’s secrets.
Depending on the direction of a call between a and b, one or both agents can
learn directly new information thanks to it. We say that these are the agents
affected in the call. For a call of direction ♦ these agents are a and b, for a call of
direction ⊲ this is b, and for a call of direction ⊳ this is a. This distinction allows
us to consider two possible levels of observance of a call:
– α: During the call the affected agent(s) add the secrets of their partner to
their own secrets, and only after that, inspect the result.5
5 This mode is akin to the caller and callee interacting through a third party, who
first collects the caller’s and callee’s secrets separately, and then shares their union
with the affected agent(s). We are indebted to R. Ramezanian for this observation.
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– β: During the call the affected agent(s) inspect the secrets of their partner
before adding them to their own secrets.
Intuitively, the observance level α is less informative for an affected agent
than β, because in the latter case she also learns which secrets were known to
the other agent before adding them to the secrets she is familiar with. Let
– P = { , , },
– D = {♦, ⊳, ⊲},
– O = {α, β}.
Each call between agents a and b is of the shape ab τ , where τ = (p, d, o) ∈
P×D×O is called its type. So we defined in total 18 call types. To clarify their
effect on communication we will elaborate on some representative call types in
Examples 3–5.
The types ( , ♦, β) and ( , ♦, β) were studied in [4] while the types ( , ♦, α),
( , ⊲, α), and ( , ⊳, α), were analyzed in [1]. For a type τ like ( , ♦, β), we define
τ(p) = , τ(d) = ♦ and τ(o) = β.
Often, the call type (or parts of it) is (are) clear from the context, and we
omit it (them). In our examples, at the level of calls, we often only explicitly
mention the direction type. Given a call between a and b we shall sometimes
write it simply as ab for the direction type ♦, a ⊲ b for the direction type ⊲ and
a ⊳ b for the direction type ⊳.
3 Language and Semantics
In this section we introduce a modal language for epistemic gossip and its formal
semantics.
3.1 Modal language
We are interested in determining agents’ knowledge after a sequence of calls took
place. To this end we use the standard modal language L for epistemic logic (see
[1]):
φ ::= FaS | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | Kaφ,
where a ∈ Ag and S ∈ S.
In what follows we refer to the elements φ of L as epistemic formulas, or
in short, just formulas. We read FaS as ‘agent a is familiar with the secret S’
(or ‘S belongs to the set of secrets a has learned’) and Kaφ as ‘agent a knows
that formula φ is true’. So L is an epistemic language with the atomic formulas
of the form FaS.
The above language was introduced in [1]. It is a modification of the language
introduced in [4].
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Example 1. Consider the statement that agent a is familiar with all the secrets.
This can be expressed as the formula
∧
b∈Ag
FaB
that we subsequently abbreviate to Expa (“a is an expert”).
Consider now the statement that each agent is familiar only with her own
secret. This can be expressed as the formula
∧
a∈Ag
(FaA ∧
∧
b∈Ag,b6=a
¬FaB). (1)
Finally, consider the statement that for each agent, say a, it is not the case
that a is an expert and each other agent is familiar with at most her own secret
and that of a. This can be expressed as the formula
∧
a∈Ag
¬(Expa ∧
∧
b,c∈Ag, |{a,b,c}|=3
¬FbC).

Next, we clarify the use of the knowledge operators. In the presented reason-
ing we assume that the agents have the knowledge of the underlying call type.
In all cases we assume that the initial situation is the one in which every agent
is only familiar with her own secret, that is, we assume (1) to be true for each
agent before any communication takes place. The examples provide intuitions
about how agents’ knowledge is influenced by the types of calls underpinning
their communications. Such intuitions will then be formalised in Section 3.2.
Example 2. Initially, each agent is familiar with her secret and knows this fact.
Additionally, she does not know that any other agent is familiar with a secret
different from his own. This can be expressed by means of the formula
∧
a∈Ag
(KaFaA ∧
∧
b,c∈Ag,a 6=b,b6=c
¬KaFbC)
that holds initially, for all call types. 
Example 3. Suppose there are four agents, a, b, c and d. Consider the call type
is ( , ♦, α). Assume the call sequence ab, bc.
Let us reason from the perspective of agent d. Because of the assumed privacy
level, after the first call, ab, agent d knows that both agents a and b are familiar
with A and B. This can be expressed as the formula
Kd(FaA ∧ FaB ∧ FbA ∧ FbB).
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This then implies that after the second call, bc, agent d also knows that both
b and c are familiar with A,B, and C. Agent’s d factual knowledge after the
second call can be expressed as the formula Kdφ, where
φ = FaA ∧ FaB ∧
∧
i∈{b,c}, j∈{a,b,c}
FiJ.
In fact, because of the assumed privacy level , how the knowledge evolves
during communication is completely transparent to all agents. Hence after both
calls everybody knows φ, i.e., ∧
a∈Ag
Kaφ.
An analogous argument applies for the call type ( , ♦, β).
Suppose now that the privacy level is . Then we cannot conclude the formula
Kdφ after the second call, since agent d only knows then that two calls took place,
but not between which pairs of agents. In fact, in this case we can only conclude
(note that the same call can be made twice):
Kd(
∨
a,b∈Ag\{d},a 6=b
(FaB ∧ FbA)).
Finally, if the privacy level is , then d is not aware of the calls ab and bc.
She considers it possible that a, b, c are already familiar with all secrets except
her own, but also considers it possible that all other agents only know their own
secret. As she has not yet been involved in any call, she knows that they are not
familiar with D.
So after the call sequence ab, bc agent’s d knowledge can be expressed as
Kd(
∧
e∈Ag\{d}
(FeE ∧ ¬FeD)).

Example 4. Suppose there are three agents, a, b and c. Consider the two call
types ( , ♦, o), where o ∈ O, and assume the call sequence ac, bc, ab. After it
the agents a and b (and c too) are familiar with all the secrets, which can be
expressed as the formula
φ = Expa ∧ Expb,
and both know this fact, which can be expressed as Kaφ ∧Kbφ.
If the observance of the calls is β, agent a also learns that prior to the call
ab agent b was familiar with a’s secret, i.e., with A. This allows a to conclude
that agent b was involved in a call with c and hence agent c is familiar with B.
We can express this as
KaFcB.
Contrast the above with the situation when the observance is α. Although
again after the considered call sequence both agents a and b are familiar with
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all the secrets, now agent a cannot conclude that agents b and c communicated.
Hence agent a does not know whether agent c is familiar with B, i.e., the formula
KaFcB is not true.
In both cases agent c (who also is an expert) does not know that agents a and
b communicated, so she does not know that they are experts. In other words,
the formula Kcφ is not true. This changes when the privacy degree is , i.e., in
that case the formula Kcφ is true. Moreover, because there are three agents, the
same conclusion holds when the privacy degree is . However, the last conclusion
does not hold anymore when there are more than three agents. 
Example 5. Assume the same call sequence as in the previous case but suppose
that the call parameters are now ( , ⊳, o), where o ∈ O. So we consider now the
call sequence c = a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b.
Because of the assumed privacy level, after this call sequence agent a knows
that agent b learned the secret C and agent c knows that agent a learned the
secret B, i.e., the following holds after c
KaFbC ∧KcFaB.
Suppose now the privacy degree is and the observance is β. Then we only
haveKaFbC as agent a cannot distinguish c from a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b. Clearly,KcFaB
does not hold after c as agent c cannot distinguish c from a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, b ⊳ a.
Finally, if the privacy degree is then for the same reason KcFaB does not
hold after c either. 
We conclude that what the agents know after a call sequence crucially de-
pends on the parameters of the calls. Further, the precise effect of a single call
on the agents’ knowledge is very subtle, both for the agents involved in it and
for the outsiders.
3.2 Semantics
We provide now a formal semantics for the modal language L.
Gossip situations and calls First we recall the following crucial notions intro-
duced in [1]. A gossip situation is a sequence s = (Qa)a∈Ag, where Qa ⊆ S
for each agent a. Intuitively, Qa is the set of secrets agent a is familiar with in
the situation s. Given a gossip situation s = (Qa)a∈Ag, we denote Qa by sa. The
initial gossip situation is the one in which each Qa equals {A} and is denoted
by i (for “initial”). The initial gossip situation reflects the fact that initially each
agent is familiar only with her own secret.
Each call transforms the current gossip situation by possibly modifying the
set of secrets the agents involved in the call are familiar with. The definition
depends solely on the direction of the call.
Definition 1. The application of a call c to a gossip situation s is defined as
follows, where s := (Qa)a∈Ag:
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c = ab c(s) = (Q′a)a∈Ag, where Q
′
a = Q
′
b = Qa ∪ Qb, Q
′
c = Qc, for c 6= a, b.
c = a ⊲ b c(s) = (Q′a)a∈Ag, where Q
′
b = Qa ∪ Qb, Q
′
a = Qa, Q
′
c = Qc, for
c 6= a, b.
c = a ⊳ b c(s) = (Q′a)a∈Ag, where Q
′
a = Qa∪Qb, Q
′
b = Qb, Q
′
c = Qc, for c 6= a, b.
This definition captures the meaning of the direction type: for ab the secrets
are shared between the caller and callee , for a⊲b they are pushed from the caller
to the callee, and for a ⊳ b they are retrieved by the caller from the callee. Note
that (a♦b)(s) = (b♦a)(s) and (a ⊲ b)(s) = (b ⊳ a)(s), as expected.
In turn, the privacy degree of a call captures what outsiders of the call learn
from it and the observance level determines informally what caller and callee can
learn about each other’s calling history. The meaning of these two parameters
will be determined by means of the appropriate equivalence relations between
call sequences.
A call sequence is a finite sequence of calls, all of the same type. The empty
sequence is denoted by ǫ. We use c to denote a call sequence and Cτ to denote
the set of all call sequences of type τ . Given the call sequence c and a call c, c.c
denotes the sequence obtained by appending c with c.
The result of applying a call sequence c to a situation s is defined by induction
using Definition 1, as follows
[Base] ǫ(s) := s,
[Step] c.c(s) := c(c(s)).
Note that this definition does not depend on the privacy degree and observance
of the calls.
Example 6. Let Ag be {a, b, c}. We use the following concise notation for gossip
situations. Sets of secrets will be written down as lists. E.g., the set {A,B,C}
will be written as ABC. Gossip situations will be written down as lists of
lists of secrets separated by dots. E.g., i = A.B.C and the gossip situation
({A,B}, {A,B}, {C}) will be written asAB.AB.C. So, (ab)(A.B.C) = AB.AB.C,
(ab, ca)(A.B.C) = ABC.AB.ABC and (ab, ca, ab)(A.B.C) = ABC.ABC.ABC.

Truth of formulas We illustrated in Examples 3–5 that each call has an effect on
the knowledge of the agents. After a sequence of calls took place the agents may
be uncertain about the current gossip situation because they do not know which
call sequence actually took place. This leads to appropriate indistinguishability
relations that allow us to reason about the knowledge of the agents. This is in a
nutshell the basis of the approach to epistemic gossip protocols put forth in [1],
and upon which we build here.
To clarify matters consider the situation analyzed in Example 4. We noticed
there that depending on the assumed observance level the knowledge of agent
a differs. This has to do with the call sequences the agent considers possible. If
the call type is ( , ♦, α) agent a cannot distinguish between the call sequences
ac, ab and ac, bc, ab. Indeed, after both sequences she is familiar with all the
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secrets but she cannot determine whether agents b and c communicated. From
her perspective both call sequences are possible, that is, she cannot distinguish
between them. In contrast, if the call type is ( , ♦, β) agent a can distinguish
between these two call sequences, which has in turn an effect on her knowledge.
In general, to determine what agents know after a call sequence we need then
to consider an appropriate equivalence relation between the call sequences. Let
c and d be two call sequences of call type τ and a an agent. The statement
c ∼τa d informally says that agent a cannot distinguish between c and d. The
definition of ∼τa crucially depends on the call type τ and is provided in the next
subsection. Here we assume that it is given and proceed to define the truth of
the formulas of the language L with respect to a gossip model (for a given set
of agents Ag) Mτ = (Cτ , {∼τa}a∈Ag) and a call sequence c as follows:
Definition 2. Let Mτ be a gossip model for a call type τ and a set of agents
Ag, and let c ∈ Cτ . The truth relation for language L is inductively defined as
follows (with Boolean connectives omitted):
(Mτ , c) |= FaS iff S ∈ c(i)a,
(Mτ , c) |= Kaφ iff ∀d ∈ C
τ such that c ∼τa d, (M
τ ,d) |= φ.
Since the gossip model is clear from the context, we will from now on write
c |=τ φ for (Mτ , c) |= φ. We also write Mτ |= φ (φ is valid in Mτ ) if for all
c ∈ Cτ we have Mτ , c |= φ.
So the formula FaS is true after a sequence of calls c whenever agent a is
familiar with the secret S in the gossip situation generated by c applied to the
initial gossip situation i. The knowledge operator Ka is interpreted as customary
in epistemic logic (see, e.g., [26,12]) using the equivalence relations ∼τa.
It is important to notice that to determine the truth of a propositional for-
mula (so in particular to determine which secrets an agent is familiar with) only
the direction parameter of the type of the calls is used. In contrast, to determine
the truth of formulas involving the knowledge operator all three parameters of
the call type are needed, through the definition of the ∼τa relations, to which we
turn next.
4 Indistinguishability of Call Sequences
Below we use two intuitive notions. We say that an agent a is involved in a call
c, and write a ∈ c, if a is one of the two agents involved in it, i.e., if it is either a
caller or a callee in c. We say that an agent a is affected by a call c if c is one
of the following forms:
a♦b, b♦a, b ⊲ a, or a ⊳ b.
Intuitively, a is affected by the call if it can affect the set of secrets a is familiar
with. So agent a is involved but not affected by a call c if c = a ⊲ b or c = b ⊳ a.
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4.1 The ∼τ
a
relations
For every call type τ and agent a we define the indistinguishability relation
∼τa⊆ C
τ ×Cτ in two steps. First we define the auxiliary relation ≈τa (Definition
3). Intuitively, the expression c ≈τa d can be interpreted as “from the point of
view of a, if c is an (epistemically) possible call sequence, so is d, and vice versa”.
Then, we define ∼τa as the least equivalence relation that contains ≈
τ
a.
Definition 3. Let a ∈ Ag and fix a type τ . The relation ≈τa is the smallest
subset of Cτ ×Cτ satisfying the following conditions:
[Base] ǫ ≈τa ǫ.
[Step] Suppose that c ≈τa d and let c and d be calls.
[Step-outτ] if Outτa(c, d) then Concl
τ
a(c,d, c, d),
[Step-in
τ
] if Inτa(c,d, c) then Concl
τ
a(c,d, c),
where the used relations are defined in Table 1. (b is there the partner of a in
the call c.)
Agent a is not involved in the last call:
τ (p) Outτa(c, d) Concl
τ
a(c,d, c, d)
a 6∈ c c.c ≈τa d.c
a 6∈ c, a 6∈ d c.c ≈τa d.d
a 6∈ c c.c ≈τa d, c ≈
τ
a d.c
Agent a is involved in but not affected by the last call:
Inτa(c,d, c) Concl
τ
a(c,d, c)
c ∈ {a ⊲ b, b ⊳ a} c.c ≈τa d.c
Agent a is involved in and affected by the last call:
τ (o) Inτa(c,d, c) Concl
τ
a(c,d, c)
α c ∈ {a♦b, b♦a, b ⊲ a, a ⊳ b}, c.c ≈τa d.c
c.c(i)a = d.c(i)a
β c ∈ {a♦b, b♦a, b ⊲ a, a ⊳ b}, c.c ≈τa d.c
c(i)b = d(i)b
Table 1. Defining indistinguishability of call sequences
The definition of ≈τa captures the complex effect of each of the three pa-
rameters of a call type on the knowledge of an agent. Let us discuss it now in
detail.
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The Base condition is clear. Consider now the Step-outτ clause which refers to
Table 1, top. Suppose that c ≈τa d. Consider first the privacy type . According
to its informal description the condition a 6∈ c means that agent a is not involved
in the call c but knows who calls whom. The conclusion c.c ≈τa d.c then coincides
with this intuition.
Consider now the privacy type . The conditions a 6∈ c and a 6∈ d mean
that agent a is not involved in the calls c and d, thus according to the informal
description of she cannot distinguish between these two calls. This explains the
conclusion c.c ≈τa d.d. Note that this conclusion is not justified for the privacy
type because if c 6= d then agent a can distinguish between these two calls, so
a fortiori between the call sequences c.c and d.d.
Finally, consider the privacy type . According to its informal description,
the condition a 6∈ c means that agent a is not aware of the call c. This justifies
the conclusions c.c ≈τa d and c ≈
τ
a d.c.
Next, consider the Step-inτ clause. It spells the conditions that allow one to
extend the ≈τa relation in case agent a is involved in the last call, c. Table 1,
middle, formalises the intuition that when agent a is not affected by the call c,
then we can conclude that c.c ≈τa d.c.
Table 1, bottom, focuses on the remaining case. Consider first the observance
α. According to its informal description, affected agents incorporate the secrets
of their partner with their own secrets and then inspect the result. So we check
what secrets agent a is familiar with after the call sequences c and d are both
extended by c. If these sets are equal, then we can conclude that c.c ≈τa d.c.
In the case the observance is β, the informal description stipulates that the
agent inspects the set of secrets of the call partner before incorporating them
with their own secrets. So we compare these sets of secrets after, respectively,
the call sequences c and d took place. If these sets are equal, then we conclude
that c.c ≈τa d.c. This explains why in this case a reference to agent b is made in
Inτa(c,d, c).
4.2 Examples and a useful observation
Example 7. We first illustrate Table 1, top, by analyzing situations in which the
considered agent is not involved in the last call. Assume four agents, a, b, c and
d.
Suppose that the privacy of τ is . We have ab, bc 6∼τa ab, cd, because ab, bc 6≈
τ
a
ab, cd as bc 6= cd and bc 6= dc. So we fail to apply Table 1, top, first row and the
transitive reflexive closure does not give us that either.
On the other hand, if the privacy of τ is , we have ab, bc ∼τa ab, cd, because
ab, bc ≈τa ab, cd, as a 6∈ bc, a 6∈ cd and ab ∼
τ
a ab (Table 1, top, second row). On
the other hand, ab, bc 6∼τa ab, cd, bc as now the clause in the second row fails to
apply, as the lengths of the compared sequences are different.
Finally, if the privacy of τ is , we of course also have ab, bc ∼τa ab, cd for
the same reason as in the previous paragraph, but we now also have ab, bc ∼τa
ab, cd, bc, because ab, bc ≈τa ab, cd, bc. Indeed, we have ab ∼
τ
a ab and hence by
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Table 1, top, third row, applied three times, first ab ∼τa ab, cd, then ab, bc ∼
τ
a
ab, cd, and finally ab, bc ∼τa ab, cd, bc. 
Example 8. To illustrate Table 1, middle, consider the same four agents and
sequence d ⊲ c, b ⊲ c, and . Then d ⊲ c, b ⊲ c ∼τb c ⊲ d, b ⊲ c, because agent b is
involved in the second call but not affected (Table 1, middle), and d ⊲ c ∼τb c ⊲ d,
because b 6∈ d ⊲ c and b 6∈ c ⊲ d (Table 1, top, second row). 
Example 9. Now consider Table 1, bottom. The difference between observances
α and β is seen in Example 5. For the observancy α we have that a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b
∼τa a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b, because agent a is afterwards familiar with the same secrets
on the lefthand side and the righthand side, namely A,B,C (Table 1, bottom,
first row). On the other hand, for the observancy β we get a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b 6∼τa
a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b, because a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c 6∼τb a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b (note that this concerns indistin-
guishability for agent b, not a); here the second row of Table 1, bottom, applies.
As a final example, we have that d⊲c, b ⊲ c 6∼τc c⊲d, b ⊲ c, because c is involved
but not affected in call c⊲d, while it is involved and affected in call d⊲c. Observe
that after d ⊲ c, b ⊲ c agent c is familiar with the secrets B,C,D, whereas after
c ⊲ d, b ⊲ c agent c is only familar with B,C. 
Let us focus now on some properties of the ∼τa equivalence relations.
Note 1. For all agents a and call types τ
∼τa= (≈
τ
a)
∗,
where ∗ is the transitive, reflexive closure operation on binary relations.
Proof. A straightforward proof by induction show that each ≈τa relation is sym-
metric. This implies the claim. 
The following observation will be needed later.
Proposition 1. For all call types τ if c ∼τa d, then c(i)a = d(i)a.
Proof. By Note 1 it is sufficient to prove the conclusion under the assumption
that c ≈τa d.
We proceed by induction on the sum k of the lengths |c| + |d| of both se-
quences. If k = 0, then c = d = ǫ, so the claim holds. Suppose the claim holds for
all pairs of sequences such that the sum of their lengths is < k and that k > 0,
|c|+ |d| = k and c ≈τa d. By definition ≈
τ
a is the smallest relation satisfying the
Base and Step conditions of Definition 3. Let c be the last call of c or of d if c
is empty.
If agent a is not involved in c, then four cases arise, depending on the form of
c and d. We consider one representative case, when c is of the form c′.c, where
c′ ≈τa d. Then by the assumption about c and the induction hypothesis
c(i)a = c
′.c(i)a = c
′(i)a = d(i)a.
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If agent a is involved in but not affected by the last call, then c is of the form
c′.c, d is of the form d′.c, c ∈ {a ⊲ b, b ⊳ a} and c′ ≈τa d
′. Then by the form of c
and the induction hypothesis
c(i)a = c
′.c(i)a = c
′(i)a = d
′(i)a = d
′.c(i)a = d(i)a.
Finally, if agent a is involved in and affected by the last call, then c is of the
form c′.c, d is of the form d′.c, c ∈ {a♦b, b♦a, b ⊲ a, a ⊳ b} and c′ ≈τa d
′.
If τ(o) = α, then by assumption c′.c(i)a = d
′.c(i)a, i.e., c(i)a = d(i)a. If
τ(o) = β, then by assumption c′(i)b = d
′(i)b. Also, by the induction hypothesis
c′(i)a = d
′(i)a, so by the form of c
c(i)a = c
′.c(i)a = c
′(i)a ∪ c
′(i)b = d
′(i)a ∪ d
′(i)b = d
′.c(i)a = d(i)a.

Corollary 1. For all call types τ , agents a, b and call sequences c
c |=τ KaFaB iff c |=
τ FaB.
Proof. By Proposition 1 and the definition of truth of KaFaB and FaB. ⊓⊔
5 Classification of the ∼τ
a
Relations
We introduced in the previous section 18 equivalence relations ∼τa, each parame-
trised by an agent a. The uniform presentation makes it possible to compare
these relations by means of a classification, which we now provide.
First, let us introduce some notation. Given two call types τ1 and τ2 we
abbreviate the statement ∀a ∈ Ag,∼τ1a ⊂∼
τ2
a to τ1 ⊂ τ2 and similarly for τ1 ⊆ τ2
and τ1 = τ2. Such statements presuppose that we systematically change the
types of all calls in the considered call sequences.
The following theorem provides the announced classification. It clarifies in
total 153 (= 18·172 ) relationships between the equivalence relations.
Theorem 1. The ∼τa equivalence relations form preorders presented in Figures
1 and 2. An arrow → from τ1 to τ2 stands here for τ1 ⊂ τ2, ( , d, o) for the set
of six call types with the privacy degree that are all equal, and ( , ♦, o) for the
set {( , ♦, α), ( , ♦, β)}.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. Below
we say that the call types τ1 and τ2 are incomparable when neither τ1 ⊆ τ2 nor
τ2 ⊆ τ1 holds. The proofs concerning the incomparability that are established
below also hold for a stronger definition, namely that τ1 and τ2 are incomparable
when for all agents a neither ∼τ1a ⊆ ∼
τ2
a nor ∼
τ2
a ⊆ ∼
τ1
a holds. This way Figures
1 and 2 can be alternatively interpreted as preorders on the ∼τa equivalence
relations, for any agent a, where an arrow → from τ1 to τ2 stands then for
∼τ1a ⊂∼
τ2
a .
We first establish the claimed equalities between the call types.
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( , d, o)
( , ♦, o)
( , ♦, β)
( , ♦, α)
( , ⊲, β)
( , ⊲, β) ( , ⊲, α)
( , ⊲, α)
( , ⊳, β)
( , ⊳, β) ( , ⊳, α)
( , ⊳, α)
Fig. 1. Classification of the ∼τa relations when |Ag| = 3.
( , d, o)
( , ♦, β)
( , ♦, β) ( , ♦, α)
( , ♦, α)
( , ⊲, β)
( , ⊲, β) ( , ⊲, α)
( , ⊲, α)
( , ⊳, β)
( , ⊳, β) ( , ⊳, α)
( , ⊳, α)
Fig. 2. Classification of the ∼τa relations when |Ag| > 3.
Lemma 1.
(i) Suppose that τ(p) = . Then each ∼τa is the identity relation.
(ii) Suppose that τ1(p) = τ2(p) = . Then τ1 = τ2.
(iii) If |Ag| = 3 then ( , ♦, β) = ( , ♦, α).
Proof.
(i) By Note 1 it is sufficient to prove that c ≈τa d implies c = d. We proceed by
induction on the sum k of the lengths |c|+ |d| of both sequences. If k = 0, then
c = d = ǫ, so the claim holds. Suppose the claim holds for all pairs of sequences
such that the sum of their lengths is < k and that k > 0, |c| + |d| = k and
c ≈τa d.
By definition ≈τa is the smallest relation satisfying the Base and Step con-
ditions of Definition 3. So, since τ(p) = , by the Step condition c is of the
form c′.c and d is of the form d′.c, where c′ ≈τa d
′. By the induction hypothesis
c′ = d′, so c = d.
(ii) By (i).
(iii) Suppose Ag = {a, b, c}. Take τ ∈ {( , ♦, β), ( , ♦, α)}. Then by Definition 3
c ∼τa d iff c and d differ only in some of the calls a is not involved in. Because
there are exactly 3 agents, each such call must be b♦c or c♦b and both have the
same effect independently of the type of observance. 
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Next we establish the claimed strict inclusions. Below the unspecified param-
eters are implicitly universally qualified. For example, ( , d, o) ⊂ ( , d, o) is an
abbreviation for the statement
∀a ∈ Ag ∀d ∈ D ∀o ∈ O ∼( ,d,o)a ⊂ ∼
( ,d,o)
a .
Lemma 2.
(i) ( , d, o) ⊂ ( , d, o).
(ii) ( , d, o) ⊂ ( , d, o).
(iii) If |Ag| > 3 or d 6= ♦ then ( , d, β) ⊂ ( , d, α).
(iv) If |Ag| = 3, d 6= ♦ and o1, o2 ∈ O, then ( , d, o1) ⊂ ( , ♦, o2).
(v) ( , d, β) ⊂ ( , d, α).
Proof. First we establish the ⊆ inclusions.
(i) and (ii) These are direct consequences of Definition 3.
(iii) We prove that ( , d, β)⊆ ( , d, α) always holds. Let τ1 = ( , d, β) and τ2 =
( , d, α). Fix an agent a.
By Note 1 it is sufficient to prove that c ≈τ1a d implies c ≈
τ2
a d. We proceed
by induction on the sum k of the lengths |c| + |d| of both sequences. If k = 0,
then c = d = ǫ, so the claim holds. Suppose the claim holds for all pairs of
sequences such that the sum of their lengths is < k and that k > 0, |c|+ |d| = k
and c ≈τ1a d. By definition ≈
τ1
a is the smallest relation satisfying the Base and
Step conditions of Definition 3. So, since τ1(p) = , by the Step condition c is
of the form c′.c and d is of the form d′.d, where c′ ≈τ1a d
′. By the induction
hypothesis c′ ≈τ2a d
′.
Three cases arise that reflect the case analysis in Definition 3, where b is the
partner of a in the call c:
(a) a 6∈ c, a 6∈ d.
Then c′ ≈τ2a d
′ implies c′.c ≈τ2a d
′.d.
(b) c ∈ {a ⊲ b, b ⊳ a}.
Then c′.c ≈τ1a d
′.d implies c = d and consequently c′ ≈τ2a d
′ implies c′.c ≈τ2a
d′.d.
(c) c ∈ {a♦b, b♦a, b ⊲ a, a ⊳ b}.
Then c′.c ≈τ1a d
′.d implies c = d and c′(i)b = d
′(i)b, because τ1(o) = β. Also
by Proposition 1 c′(i)a = d
′(i)a, so
c′.c(i)a = c
′(i)a ∪ c
′(i)b = d
′(i)a ∪ d
′(i)b = d
′.c(i)a.
Hence c′ ≈τ2a d
′ implies c′.c ≈τ2a d
′.d, because τ2(o) = α.
(iv) Let τ1 = ( , d, o1) and τ2 = ( , ♦, o2). Fix an agent a.
By Note 1 it suffices to prove that c ≈τ1a d implies c ≈
τ2
a d. Two cases arise.
(a) d = ⊲.
Because there are only 3 agents, by Definition 3 if c ≈τ1a d then c and d
differ only in some of the calls a is not involved in. So then c and d, when
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interpreted under τ2, differ only in some of the calls between b and c, which
are b♦c or c♦b, and both have the same effect independently of the type of
observance.
So c ∼τ1a d implies c ∼
τ2
a d.
(b) d = ⊳.
The argument is the same as in (a).
(v) The proof is analogous to the one given in (iii) and is omitted.
We prove now that the inclusions are strict. Suppose that a, b, c ∈ Ag are
different agents.
(i) Note that for τ1 = ( , d, o) and τ2 = ( , d, o) we have bc ∼
τ2
a cb, while
bc 6∼τ1a cb.
(ii) Note that for τ1 = ( , d, o) and τ2 = ( , d, o) we have bc ∼
τ2
a ǫ, while bc 6∼
τ1
a ǫ.
(iii) Let τ1 = ( , d, β) and τ2 = ( , d, α). Assume first that |Ag| > 3. Suppose
a, b, c, d ∈ Ag are different agents. Three cases arise.
(a) d = ♦.
Then a♦b, a♦c, b♦c, a♦b ∼τ2a a♦b, a♦c, c♦d, a♦b, while a♦b, a♦c, b♦c, a♦b 6∼
τ1
a
a♦b, a♦c, c♦d, a♦b.
(b) d = ⊲.
Then c⊲a, b⊲c, b⊲a ∼τ2a c⊲a, c⊲b, b⊲a, while c⊲a, b⊲c, b⊲a 6∼
τ1
a c⊲a, c⊲b, b⊲a.
(c) d = ⊳.
a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b ∼τ2a a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b, while a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b 6∼
τ1
a a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b.
Assume now that d 6= ♦. Then the desired conclusion is established in (b)
and (c), as the examples used there involve only three agents.
(iv) Let τ1 = ( , d, o1) and τ2 = ( , ♦, o2). Assume Ag = {a, b, c}. Two cases
arise.
(a) d = ⊲.
Note that c♦b, c♦a ∼τ2a b♦c, c♦a, while c ⊲ b, c ⊲ a 6∼
τ1
a b ⊲ c, c ⊲ a.
(b) d = ⊳.
Note that b♦c, a♦c ∼τ2a c♦b, a♦c, while b ⊳ c, a ⊳ c 6∼
τ1
a c ⊳ b, a ⊳ c.
(v) Let τ1 = ( , d, α) and τ2 = ( , d, β). Three cases arise.
(a) d = ♦.
Note that a♦c, a♦b ∼τ1a a♦c, b♦c, a♦b, while a♦c, a♦b 6∼
τ2
a a♦c, b♦c, a♦b.
(b) d = ⊲.
Note that c ⊲ a, b ⊲ a ∼τ1a c ⊲ a, c ⊲ b, b ⊲ a, while c ⊲ a, b ⊲ a 6∼
τ2
a c ⊲ a, c ⊲ b, b ⊲ a.
(c) d = ⊳.
Note that a ⊳ c, a ⊳ b ∼τ1a a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b, while a ⊳ c, a ⊳ b 6∼
τ2
a a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b.

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As a side remark note that Lemmas 1(ii), (iii) and 2(iii), (v) imply that
(p, d, β)⊆ (p, d, α).
Finally, we establish the claims concerning incomparability of the types.
Lemma 3. Let d, d1, d2 ∈ D and o1, o2 ∈ O.
(i) Suppose that |Ag| > 3 or ♦ 6∈ {d1, d2}, and d1 6= d2. Then ( , d1, o1) and
( , d2, o2) are incomparable.
(ii) Suppose that d1 6= d2. Then ( , d1, o1) and ( , d2, o2) are incomparable.
(iii) Suppose that |Ag| = 3 and d 6= ♦. Then ( , ♦, α) and ( , d, α) are incompa-
rable.
(iv) Suppose that |Ag| > 3 or ♦ 6∈ {d1, d2}, and d1 6= d2. Then ( , d1, β) and
( , d2, α) are incomparable.
(v) Suppose that |Ag| > 3 or d 6= ♦. Then ( , d, α) and ( , d, β) are incompa-
rable.
Proof. Suppose that a, b, c ∈ Ag are different agents.
(i) Let τ1 = ( , d1, o1) and τ2 = ( , d2, o2).
Assume first that |Ag| > 3. Suppose a, b, c, d ∈ Ag are different agents. For
each pair of distinct direction types we exhibit appropriate call sequences. In
each case the conclusions do not depend on the observance level.
(a) d1 = ⊳ and d2 = ♦.
Then b ⊳ c, c ⊳ a ∼τ1a b ⊳ d, c ⊳ a, while b♦c, c♦a 6∼
τ2
a b♦d, c♦a.
Further, b♦c, a♦c ∼τ2a c♦b, a♦c, while b ⊳ c, a ⊳ c 6∼
τ1
a c ⊳ b, a ⊳ c.
(b) d1 = ⊲ and d2 = ♦.
Then c ⊲ b, a ⊲ c ∼τ1a d ⊲ b, a ⊲ c, while c♦b, a♦c 6∼
τ2
a d♦b, a♦c.
Further, c♦b, c♦a ∼τ2a b♦c, c♦a, while c ⊲ b, c ⊲ a 6∼
τ1
a b ⊲ c, c ⊲ a.
(c) d1 = ⊲ and d2 = ⊳.
Then b ⊲ c, a ⊲ c ∼τ1a c ⊲ b, a ⊲ c, while b ⊳ c, a ⊳ c 6∼
τ2
a c ⊳ b, a ⊳ c.
Further, c ⊳ b, c ⊳ a ∼τ2a b ⊳ c, c ⊳ a, while c ⊲ b, c ⊲ a 6∼
τ1
a b ⊲ c, c ⊲ a.
Assume now that ♦ 6∈ {d1, d2}. Then the desired conclusion is established in
(c), as both examples used there involve only three agents.
(ii) Let τ1 = ( , d1, o1) and τ2 = ( , d2, o2). We proceed by the same case analysis
as in the proof of (i).
(a) d1 = ⊳ and d2 = ♦.
Then b ⊳ c, c ⊳ a ∼τ1a c ⊳ a, while b♦c, c♦a 6∼
τ2
a c♦a.
(b) d1 = ⊲ and d2 = ♦.
Then c ⊲ b, a ⊲ c ∼τ1a a ⊲ c, while c♦b, a♦c 6∼
τ2
a a♦c.
(c) d1 = ⊲ and d2 = ⊳.
Then both examples used in the proof of item (c) in (i) apply here, as well.
To prove that c ∼τ2a d does not imply c ∼
τ1
a d we can use the same examples
as in the proof of (i).
(iii) Let τ1 = ( , ♦, α) and τ2 = ( , d, α). We distinguish two cases.
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(a) d = ⊲.
Then c♦b, c♦a ∼τ1a b♦c, c♦a, while c ⊲ b, c ⊲ a 6∼
τ2
a b ⊲ c, c ⊲ a.
(b) d = ⊳.
Then b♦c, a♦c ∼τ1a c♦b, a♦c, while b ⊳ c, a ⊳ c 6∼
τ2
a c ⊳ b, a ⊳ c.
Next, note that for all d 6= ♦ we have bc ∼τ2a ǫ, while bc 6∼
τ1
a ǫ.
(iv) Let τ1 = ( , d1, β) and τ2 = ( , d2, α).
Assume first that |Ag| > 3. Suppose a, b, c, d ∈ Ag are different agents. For
each pair of distinct direction types we exhibit appropriate call sequences.
(a) d1 = ⊲, d2 = ⊳.
Then c ⊲ b, a ⊲ b ∼τ1a b ⊲ c, a ⊲ b, while c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b 6∼
τ2
a b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b.
(b) d1 = ⊲, d2 = ♦.
Then c ⊲ b, a ⊲ c ∼τ1a d ⊲ b, a ⊲ c, while c♦b, a♦c 6∼
τ2
a d♦b, a♦c.
(c) d1 = ⊳, d2 = ⊲.
Then b ⊳ c, b ⊳ a ∼τ1a c ⊳ b, b ⊳ a, while b ⊲ c, b ⊲ a 6∼
τ2
a c ⊲ b, b ⊲ a.
(d) d1 = ⊳, d2 = ♦.
Then b ⊳ c, c ⊳ a ∼τ1a b ⊳ d, c ⊳ a, while b♦c, c♦a 6∼
τ2
a b♦d, c♦a.
(e) d1 = ♦, d2 = ⊲.
Then c♦b, c♦a ∼τ1a b♦c, c♦a, while c ⊲ b, c ⊲ a 6∼
τ2
a b ⊲ c, c ⊲ a.
(f) d1 = ♦, d2 = ⊳.
Then b♦c, a♦c ∼τ1a c♦b, a♦c, while b ⊳ c, a ⊳ c 6∼
τ2
a c ⊳ b, a ⊳ c.
Assume now that ♦ 6∈ {d1, d2}. Then the desired conclusion is established in
(a) and (c), as both examples used there involve only three agents.
Next, note that for all direction types bc ∼τ2a ǫ, while bc 6∼
τ1
a ǫ.
(v) Let τ1 = ( , d, α) and τ2 = ( , d, β).
Assume first that |Ag| > 3. Suppose a, b, c, d ∈ Ag are different agents.
(a) d = ♦.
Then a♦b, a♦c, b♦c, a♦b ∼τ1a a♦b, a♦c, c♦d, a♦b, while a♦b, a♦c, b♦c, a♦b 6∼
τ2
a
a♦b, a♦c, c♦d, a♦b.
(b) d = ⊲.
Then c⊲a, b⊲c, b⊲a ∼τ1a c⊲a, c⊲b, b⊲a, while c⊲a, b⊲c, b⊲a 6∼
τ2
a c⊲a, c⊲b, b⊲a.
(c) d = ⊳.
Then a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b ∼τ1a a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b, while a ⊳ c, c ⊳ b, a ⊳ b 6∼
τ2
a a ⊳ c, b ⊳ c, a ⊳ b.
Assume now that d 6= ♦. Then the desired conclusion is established in (b)
and (c) as both examples used there involve only three agents.
Finally, note that for all direction types bc ∼τ2a ǫ, while bc 6∼
τ1
a ǫ. 
The above Lemmas imply the classification of the ∼τa relations given in The-
orem 1 and visualized in Figures 1 and 2. Indeed, the equalities (represented
as sets) are established in Lemma 1, the strict inclusions (that correspond to
the arrows) are established in Lemma 2, and Lemma 3 implies that no further
strict inclusions (i.e., arrows) are present. For example, there is no arrow in Fig-
ure 2 between two different diamond shaped subgraphs that correspond to the
direction types ⊲, ♦, and ⊳ because by Lemma 3(iv) for d1 6= d2 the call types
( , d1, β) and ( , d2, α) are incomparable.
Application of the classification
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6 Applications of the Classification
The section shows how the above systematisation of ∼τa relations, through the
standard epistemic logic semantics of Definition 2, enables general insights into
the epistemic effects of call sequences and offers a natural handle on how to
model assumptions to the effect that agents have common knowledge of the
protocol in use.
6.1 Epistemic effects of communication types
The above classification is useful in order to draw general epistemic consequences
in presence of different communication types. Below we will be using two frag-
ments of L:
– L+1 , consisting of the literals FaS and ¬FaS, ∧,∨ and Ka,
– L+2 , consisting of the atomic formulas FaS, ∧,∨ and Ka.
Proposition 2. Consider two call types τ1 and τ2 such that τ1(d) = τ2(d).
(i) For all literals ψ and all c, c |=τ2 ψ =⇒ c |=τ1 ψ.
(ii) If τ1 ⊆ τ2 then
for all formulas φ ∈ L+1 and all c, c |=
τ2 φ =⇒ c |=τ1 φ.
Proof.
(i) By assumption τ1(d) = τ2(d), so both occurrences of c refer to identical call
sequences. Hence for all atomic formulas FaS and all c, c |=
τ2 FaS iff c |=
τ1 FaS.
(ii) We proceed by induction on the structure of φ. The only case that requires
explanation is when φ is of the form Kaψ. Suppose that c |=
τ2 Kaψ. To prove
c |=τ1 Kaψ take a call sequence d such that c ∼
τ1
a d. By assumption τ1 ⊆ τ2,
hence c ∼τ2a d and so d |=
τ2 ψ. By the induction hypothesis d |=τ1 ψ, so by
definition c |=τ1 Kaψ. 
It is easy to construct examples showing that the implication in (ii) does not
hold for all formulas. For instance, for τ1 = ( , ♦, α) and τ2 = ( , ♦, α) we have
τ1 ⊆ τ2 by Theorem 1 and bc |=
τ2 ¬KaFbC but not bc |=
τ1 ¬KaFbC.
We finally compare knowledge for call types with different direction types.
Then claim (i) in the above Proposition does not hold anymore. Indeed, for
τ1 and τ2 such that τ1(d) = ♦ and τ2(d) = ⊲ we have ab |=
τ2 ¬FaB but not
ab |=τ1 ¬FaB. However, the following weaker claim does hold.
Proposition 3. Consider two call types τ1 and τ2 such that τ1(d) = ♦.
(i) For all atomic formulas ψ and all c, c |=τ2 ψ =⇒ c |=τ1 ψ.
(ii) If τ1 ⊆ τ2 then
for all formulas φ ∈ L+2 and all c, c |=
τ2 φ =⇒ c |=τ1 φ.
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Proof. By Proposition 2 we can assume that τ2(d) 6= ♦.
(i) We use induction on the length |c| of c. Assume that τ2(d) = ⊲. If |c| = 0
then c = ǫ and ǫ |=τ2 FcD iff D = C iff ǫ |=
τ1 FcD. Now suppose the claim is
proven for c and consider c.ab.
For any agent c 6= b, we have by Definition 1 c.a ⊲ b |=τ2 FcD iff c |=
τ2 FcD,
which implies by the induction hypothesis c |=τ1 FcD, and hence c.a♦b |=
τ1 FcD.
For agent b, we have c.a ⊲ b |=τ2 FbD iff (c |=
τ2 FaD or c |=
τ2 FbD) and
c.a♦b |=τ1 FbD iff (c |=
τ1 FaD or c |=
τ1 FbD), so the claim for b holds by the
induction hypothesis, as well.
The proof for τ2(d) = ⊳ is analogous and omitted.
(ii) The claim follows by (i) and the argument used in the proof of Proposition
2. 
Proposition 2 holds for example for τ1 = ( , ♦, β) and τ2 = ( , ♦, α), since by
Theorem 1
( , ♦, β) ⊂ ( , ♦, β) ⊂ ( , ♦, β) ⊂ ( , ♦, α).
In turn, Proposition 3 holds for example for τ1 = ( , ♦, β) and τ2 = ( , ⊲, α),
since by Theorem 1
( , ♦, β) = ( , ⊲, β) ⊂ ( , ⊲, β) ⊂ ( , ⊲, β) ⊂ ( , ⊲, α).
In particular, for both pairs of τ1 and τ2 for all call sequences c, c |=
τ2 KaFbC
implies c |=τ1 KaFbC. Informally, under τ1 the agents are then more informed
about the knowledge of other agents than under τ2.
Further, note that by Theorem 1 if τ1(d) = ♦ 6= τ2(d) then τ1 ⊆ τ2 iff τ1(p) =
, so under the assumption τ1(d) = ♦ 6= τ2(d) the second claim of Proposition 3
can be rewritten as
If τ1(p) = then for all formulas φ ∈ L
+
2 and all c, c |=
τ2 φ =⇒ c |=τ1 φ.
This implication (under the assumption τ1(d) = ♦ 6= τ2(d)) does not hold for
the other two privacy types because of the following instructive counterexample.
Example 10. Assume Ag = {a, b, c}. Suppose τ1 = (p, ♦, α), τ2 = (p, ⊲, α), where
p 6= , and c = ac, cb, ba. We claim that then c |=τ2 KaKcFbC but not c |=
τ1
KaKcFbC.
(i) p = .
Then c |=τ2 KaKcFbC. The reason is that the only call sequence ∼
τ2
a equiv-
alent to c is c itself. Indeed, if c ∼τ2a d, then d has to be of the form ac, c, ba,
where a 6∈ c, and by the first entry in Table 1, bottom, also c(i)a = (ac, c, ba)(i)a
has to hold. But c(i)a = {A,B,C}, which implies that c = cb.
Thus c |=τ2 KaKcFbC iff c |=
τ2 KcFbC and the latter is easy to check.
However, c 6|=τ1 KaKcFbC since c ∼
τ1
a ac, de, ba and ac, de, ba 6|=
τ1 KcFbC.
(ii) p = .
The reasoning is now a bit more involved. To show that c |=τ2 KaKcFbC
take a call sequence d such that c ∼τ2a d. Then d is of the form d1, ac,d2, ba,d3,
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where agent a is not involved in any call from d1,d2,d3. Moreover c(i)a = d(i)a
holds, as well. But, as already noted in (i), c(i)a = {A,B,C}, which implies that
one of the calls in d1 or d2 is cb.
Now, for any call sequence d in which the call cb appears we have d |=τ2
KcFbC. Indeed, if d ∼
τ2
c d
′ then the call cb appears in d′, as well, and hence
d′ |=τ2 FbC. However, c 6|=
τ1 KaKcFbC since, as in (i), c ∼
τ1
a ac, de, ba and
ac, de, ba 6|=τ1 KcFbC.
Analogous examples can be constructed for the pull calls. 
This example shows that for the and privacy degrees the push calls may
convey more knowledge than the push-pull calls, even though the former ones
result in less informative communication. The same is the case for the pull calls.
6.2 Common knowledge of protocols
When reasoning about specific protocols it is necessary to limit the set of con-
sidered call sequences to those that are ‘legal’ for it. When the agents form a
graph given in advance one can simply limit the set of considered call sequences
by allowing only syntactically legal calls. This affects the definition of seman-
tics and can be of importance when reasoning about the correctness of specific
protocols.
For example, in [1] a specific protocol for a directed ring is proved correct
(Protocol R2 on page 61, for 3 or 4 agents) by allowing for each agent a only the
calls between her and her successor a ⊕ 1, and using the fact that the formula
KaFa⊕1A⊖1→ FaA⊖1 is then true. Here A⊖1 is the secret of the predecessor
of agent a, so this formula states that if agent a knows that her successor is
familiar with the secret A ⊖ 1 of her predecessor then agent a is familiar with
the secret A⊖ 1.
A more challenging task is to incorporate into the framework an assumption
that the agents have common knowledge of the underlying protocol.6
Example 11. Consider Protocol 2 (Hear my Secret) from Section 2 with the
direction type ♦. Recall that in this protocol an agent a can call agent b if ¬KaFba
is true after the current call sequence. So each pair of agents can communicate
at most once.
Assume now four agents a, b, c, d. Then the call sequence ab, bc, bd is compliant
with the protocol independently on the assumptions about the privacy degree
and observance. Let us analyse the situation after this call sequence took place.
Assume first the privacy degree . Then agent c knows which calls took place
and hence knows that after the third call agent d is familiar with her secret, C.
So after these three calls agent c cannot call agent d anymore.
The situation changes when the privacy degree is . Through the second call
agent c learns the secret A, so she knows that the first call was ab or ba. Agent
6 This issue was identified as an open problem for epistemic gossip in [1]. The same
issue manifests itself in other knowledge-based asynchronous protocols, such as the
one investigated recently in [24].
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c is not involved in the third call, but by the assumed privacy degree she still
knows that a third call has taken place.
Assume now that the agents have common knowledge of the protocol. So
agent c knows that each pair of agents can communicate at most once. Hence
she can conclude that d must be involved in the third call and consequently
that the third call was between agent d and agent a or b. Agent c therefore
now knows that after the third call agent d is familiar with at least 3 secrets:
A,B,D if the call was with agent a or A,B,C,D if the call was with agent b.
But agent c cannot anymore conclude that agent d is familiar with her secret,
C, and consequently can call d.
Suppose now that the privacy degree is still but the call sequence is
ab, bc, cd, bd. Consider now agent a. After the fourth call she knows that after
the call ab three calls took place between the agents b, c, d. Further, she knows
that each pair of agents can communicate at most once. So agent a concludes
that each pair of agents from {b, c, d} communicated precisely once. In particu-
lar both agents c and d communicated with agent b and hence both of them are
familiar with the secret A. So after these four calls agent a cannot call anymore
any agent.
Finally consider the privacy degree and suppose the call sequence is ab, bc, bd
or ab, bc, cd, bd. Then agent a does not know whether any calls took place after
the call ab. In particular she cannot conclude that any of the agents c and d are
familiar with her secret and hence can call either c or d. 
To discuss the matters further let us be more precise about the syntax of the
protocols. An epistemic gossip protocol (in short a protocol) consists of the
union of |Ag| sets of instructions, one set for each agent. Each instruction is of
the form
if φ then execute call c,
in symbols φ → c, where φ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form
Kaψ, where a is the caller in the call c. The formula φ is referred to as an
epistemic guard . Such instructions are executed iteratively, where at each time
one instruction is selected (at random, or based on some fairness considerations)
whose guard is true after the call sequence executed so far.7
We therefore view a protocol P as a set of instructions φ→ c. For example,
the instructions composing Protocol 2, are of the form
¬KaFbA→ ab
for all agents a and b. That is, if a does not know whether b is not familiar with
her secret, a calls b.
To justify the restriction on the syntax of the epistemic guards note the
following observation.
7 This simple rendering of protocols suffices for the purposes of this section. More
sophisticated formalizations of epistemic gossip protocols have been provided in [4,1].
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Note 2. Consider a call type τ such that τ(p) = . Then for all agents a, b, c and
all call sequences c and formulas φ
c |=τ Kaφ iff c.bc |=
τ Kaφ.
Consequently, the same equivalence holds for all formulas that are Boolean com-
binations of formulas of the form Kaφ, so in particular for all epistemic guards
used in the instructions for agent a.
Proof. By Definition 3 if the privacy type of τ is then c ∼τa c.bc, which implies
the claim. ⊓⊔
This note states that the calls in which agent a is not involved have no effect
on the truth of the epistemic guards used in the instructions for agent a. If we
allowed in the epistemic guards for agent a as conjuncts formulas not prefixed
by Ka, this natural and desired property would not hold anymore.
Indeed, assume the privacy type and consider the protocol for three agents,
a, b, c, in which the only instructions are ¬FbA ∧ FbC → ab for agent a and
¬FbC → bc for agent b. Then initially only the call bc can be performed. After
it, the call ab can be performed upon which the protocol terminates. In other
words, the call bc, of which agent a is not aware, affects the truth of its epistemic
guard, which contradicts the idea behind the privacy type .
For the privacy type this restriction on the syntax of the epistemic guards
is not needed as then all formulas are equivalent to the propositional ones.
Note 3. Consider a call type τ such that τ(p) = . Then for all agents a and all
formulas φ and call sequences c
c |=τ Kaφ iff c |=
τ φ.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the fact that when the privacy type of τ
is then by Lemma 1(i) each relation ∼τa is the identity. ⊓⊔
Let us return now to the matter of common knowledge of a protocol. In Defi-
nition 3 the τ -dependent indistinguishability relations are constructed assuming
that any call is possible after any call sequence. This builds in the resulting gos-
sip modelsMτ = (Cτ , {∼τa}a∈Ag) the assumption that agents may consider any
call sequence possible in principle, including calls that are not legal if we assume
that the agents have common knowledge of the protocol in use.
Specifically, given a gossip modelMτ = (Cτ , {∼τa}a∈Ag) and a protocol P we
define the computation tree CτP ⊆ C
τ of P (cf. [1]) as the set of call sequences
inductively defined as follows:
[Base] ǫ ∈ CτP ,
[Step] If c ∈ CτP and c |=
τ φ then c.c ∈ CτP , where φ→ c ∈ P .
So CτP is a (possibly infinite) set of finite call sequences that is iteratively ob-
tained by performing a ‘legal’ call (according to protocol P ) from a ‘legal’ (ac-
cording to protocol P ) call sequence. We refer to such legal call sequences as
P -compliant.8
8 We call CτP a tree since its elements can be arranged in an obvious way in (a possibly
infinite, but finitely branching) tree.
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Note however, that when building such a computation tree, the epistemic
guard φ is evaluated with respect to the underlying gossip model Mτ , which
may well include call sequences that are not P -compliant. So in order to restrict
the domain of the gossip model to only P -compliant sequences, the epistemic
guards of the protocol need to be evaluated, and to do that one needs in turn
a gossip model, which contains only P -compliant sequences. This circularity is
not problematic for the call types involving privacy degrees and , as the
∼τa relations then link only sequences of equal length, allowing therefore for
call sequences and these equivalence relations to be inductively constructed in
parallel. That is however not the case for the call types involving privacy degree
, as then call sequences of any length may be indistinguishable from the actual
call sequence.
We propose here a solution to the above issue, showing how under a natural
assumption on the syntax of the epistemic guards one can construct, also for the
privacy degree , a gossip model which consists only of call sequences that are
compliant with a given protocol P .
Fix till the end of the section an arbitrary call type τ . First, we introduce
the definition of semantics relativised to a set X ⊆Cτ of call sequences. Let
MτX = (X, {∼
τ
a}a∈Ag), where each ∼
τ
a relation is restricted to X ×X , and let
c ∈ X . Then the definition of semantics is the same as before with the except of
the formulas of the form Kaφ:
(MτX , c) |= Kaφ iff ∀d ∈ X such that c ∼
τ
a d, (M
τ
X ,d) |= φ.
Fix now a protocol P and a set X ⊆Cτ . We define the relativised computa-
tion tree of P as the set Cτ(P,X) obtained by replacing the above Base and Step
conditions by
[Base] ǫ ∈ Cτ(P,X),
[Step] If c ∈ X∩Cτ(P,X) and (M
τ
X , c) |= φ then c.c ∈ C
τ
(P,X), where φ→ c ∈ P ,
and refer to each call sequence from Cτ(P,X) as (P,X)-compliant.
We now limit the syntax of epistemic guards as follows. A formula Kˆaφ is an
abbreviation for ¬Ka¬φ and Lˆ denotes the existential fragment of L, consisting
of only literals, ∨, ∧, and Kˆa.
The following lemma clarifies the introduction of the language Lˆ.
Lemma 4. If X ⊆ Y ⊆Cτ then
for all formulas φ ∈ Lˆ and all c ∈ X, (MτX , c) |= φ =⇒ (M
τ
Y , c) |= φ.
Proof. The only case that requires explanation is when φ is of the form Kˆaψ.
Suppose that (MτX , c) |= φ. Then for some d ∈ X such that c ∼
τ
a d, (M
τ
X ,d) |=
ψ. By the induction hypothesis (MτY ,d) |= ψ, so by definition (M
τ
Y , c) |= φ. ⊓⊔
Define next an operator ρP : 2C
τ
→ 2C
τ
by
ρP (X) = X ∩Cτ(P,X).
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That is, ρP removes from a given set X of call sequences those that are not
(P,X)-compliant. What we are after is a set from which no sequences would be
removed, so a fixpoint of ρP .
Proposition 4. Suppose the epistemic guards of a protocol P are all from Lˆ.
Then there exists an X ⊆ Cτ such that X = ρP (X).
Proof. Suppose that X ⊆ Y and c ∈ X ∩Cτ(P,X). We prove that c ∈ C
τ
(P,Y ) by
induction on the length of c. If c = ǫ, then c ∈ Cτ(P,Y ) by the Base condition.
Otherwise, by the Step condition c is of the form c′.c, where c′ ∈ X∩Cτ(P,X),
and for some φ ∈ Lˆ, (MτX , c
′) |= φ, and φ→ c ∈ P . By the induction hypothesis
c′ ∈ Cτ(P,Y ). Further, c
′ ∈ Y and by Lemma 4 (MτY , c
′) |= φ, so c ∈ Cτ(P,Y ).
It follows that ρP is a monotonic function, that is, X ⊆ Y implies ρP (X) ⊆
ρP (Y ). By the Knaster-Tarski theorem of [30] ρP has therefore fixpoints, includ-
ing a largest and a smallest one. 
Intuitively, when the domain X ⊆Cτ of a gossip model is a fixpoint of ρP ,
then the restriction of the definition of the indistinguishability relations ∼τa to
such a domain has the effect that the call sequences considered possible by the
agents coincide with the call sequences generated by the protocol. Such gossip
models incorporate then the assumption that there is common knowledge among
the agents about the protocol in use.
Furthermore, by the Knaster-Tarski theorem one can construct the largest
fixpoint of ρP by iteratively applying ρP to Cτ . Such fixpoint νρP is the most
natural domain for a gossip model that realises the assumption of common knowl-
edge of the protocol, with the (P, νρP )-compliant call sequences viewed as the
P -compliant ones.
When the privacy degree is such a gossip model has a very simple structure,
namely (CτP , {∼
τ
a}a∈Ag).
Corollary 2. Consider a protocol P and a call type τ such that τ(p) = . Then
νρP = CτP .
Proof. Note that we always have ρP (Cτ ) = CτP . We now show thatC
τ
P ⊆C
τ
(P,Cτ
P
)
by induction on the length of the call sequences. We only need to consider the
induction step. So consider some c.c ∈ CτP . By definition c ∈ C
τ
P and c |=
τ φ,
where φ→ c ∈ P , and by the induction hypothesis c ∈ Cτ(P,Cτ
P
).
Let φ′ be obtained from φ by removing all occurrences of Ka for all agents a.
By Note 3 relativised to an arbitrary X ⊆Cτ such that c ∈ X we have c |=τ φ
iff c |=τ φ′ iff (MτX , c) |= φ
′ iff (MτX , c) |= φ. So in particular (M
τ
Cτ
P
, c) |= φ
and hence by definition c.c ∈ Cτ(P,Cτ
P
).
Consequently ρP (CτP ) = C
τ
P ∩ C
τ
(P,Cτ
P
) = C
τ
P and hence C
τ
P is the largest
fixpoint of ρP . ⊓⊔
The syntactic restriction on the epistemic guards used in Proposition 4 is
clearly satisfied by Protocol 2 as its guards can be rewritten as Kˆi¬FjI. The
27
same is the case for all protocols studied in [1] since by Corollary 1 for all call
types and all agents a and b the formulas KaFaB and FaB are equivalent and
consequently each formula FaB can be replaced by ¬Kˆa¬FaB.
7 Conclusions
We provided an in-depth study of 18 different types of communication relevant
for epistemic gossip protocols and modelled their epistemic effects in a uniform
way through different indistinguishability relations. This led us to establish a
precise map of the relative informativeness of these types of communication
(Theorem 1). In turn, this result allowed us to prove general results concerning
the epistemic effects of call sequences under different communication regimes
(Propositions 2 and 3) and to advance a natural proposal on how to model and
analyse agents’ common knowledge of gossip protocols (Proposition 4), a still
under-investigated issue in the literature.
Several natural directions for future research present themselves. We mention
three of them. The first question concerns axiomatisation of the modal language
L introduced in Section 3. This problem is parametrised by the underlying in-
distinguishability relations introduced in Section 4. For example, by Note 3 the
equivalence φ↔ Kaφ holds for the privacy type but not for the other two.
Actually, even the axiomatization of FaS formulas is not straightforward, as
it has to take into account the nature of the communication. Indeed, consider
the following formula, where a 6= b:
(FbA ∧
∧
i6=a,b
¬FiA)→ FaB.
It states that if agent b is the only agent (different from a) familiar with the
secret of a, then agent a is familiar with the secret of b. A more general version
is:
(
∨
i∈X
FiA ∧
∧
i6∈X∪{a}
¬FiA)→
∨
i∈X
FaI,
where a 6∈ X .
Intuitively it states that if somebody from a group X , to which a does not
belong, is familiar with her secret and nobody from outside of the group X
(except a) is familiar with this secret, then agent a is familiar with a secret of
somebody from the group X . Clearly, both formulas are valid for the ♦ direction
type.
In general such an axiomatisation project could be carried out at several
levels (cf. [14]): by considering FiS formulas as primitive, as we did in this paper;
or analysing them as “knowing whether” formulas (in epistemic logic notation,
KiS∨Ki¬S) as in [4]. Whether the latter level of analysis can be easily reconciled
with the one proposed in this paper is an interesting open problem.
The second question addresses the problem of decidability of the 18 defini-
tions of truth we introduced. In the terminology of this paper [3] established for
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the call type ( , ♦, α) that the semantics and the definition of truth are both
decidable for the formulas without nested modalities. It would be interesting to
establish analogous results for the remaining call types, ideally by providing a
single, uniform proof that generalises the arguments of [3].
The final question concerns the robustness of our analysis, and specifically
of the relationships identified in Theorem 1, with respect to modes of gossip
that involve the transfer of higher-order epistemic information as introduced
and studied in [20,21]. Intuitively, we would expect this type of higher-order
epistemic communication to have an impact on the effects of the asymmetric
communication types ⊲ and ⊳ and for the full privacy degree.
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